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I   Introduction 
 
It is an honour and a privilege to deliver the Sixth Annual Lecture on Religious Liberty. My 
thanks to Dean Michael Quinlan and the University of Notre Dame Australia for the invitation. 
In this address I wish to ask whether the protection of religious freedom is better recast 
as a claim for respect for freedom of conscience. If the cause of religious liberty has had its 
detractors of late—given the increasing odium with which organized religion is viewed by 
many—is the way forward to present claims as incursions upon one’s liberty of conscience? 
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Although this may appear a more promising and stronger approach on a number of 
bases, it is my contention that it has serious weaknesses. Freedom of conscience may be too 
weak a reed. It is a valuable supplement to religious freedom, but not sufficient on its own to 
bear the weight and range of claims commonly advanced as religious liberty violations.  
 I will begin by asserting that the right of religious freedom is under increasing pressure 
from a number of quarters. At a popular level many express concern—sometimes in a strident 
fashion—that religious liberty has become a euphemistic banner for religious folk to engage in 
conduct that, to the critics, looks like plain bigotry and prejudice. No wonder then that, also at 
a popular level, some religious people respond, if not a little dramatically, that there has been 
a “seismic shift” in Western societies that has given birth to “today’s historic explosion of 
intolerance towards religious believers”.1  In the quieter corridors of academia and in the pages 
of esoteric journals, scholars question the need for exemptions from the law of the land for 
religionists. They write books with disarming titles like Why Tolerate Religion?2 They 
challenge the very core notion that there is anything special about religion in this secular age—
questioning whether it deserves, for example, any form of privileged treatment by way of 
charitable status, continued inconvenient protection of doctors’ and nurses’ consciences, 
dispensation from antidiscrimination norms, and so on. To fully substantiate my argument 
would require another lecture3, so I trust you will indulge me if will simply take this—religious 
freedom is under greater attack—as my premise. 
 
II   The Promise of the Turn to Freedom of Conscience 
 
Given the increasing vulnerability of the right of religious freedom, is there a better basis to 
understand the phenomenon and sympathetically address claims brought by those whose faith 
																																																						
1 Mary Eberstadt, It’s Dangerous to Believe: Religious Freedom and Its Enemies (New York: Harper, 
2016) at xi and 1. In a similar vein see Melanie Phillips, The World Turned Upside Down: The Global 
Battle over God, Truth and Power (New York: Encounter Books, 2010) especially ch 6, “The Secular 
Inquisition”. 
2 Brian Leiter, Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013). 
3 See generally James Orr, “Beyond Belief: Defending religious liberty through the British Bill of 
rights”, Res Publica (November 2016); W Cole Durham Jr, “Religion and Equality: Reconcilable 
Differences?” in W Cole Durham Jr and Donlu Thayer (eds), Religion and Equality (London: 
Routledge, 2016) ch 12. For Australian readers, see eg Paul Babie and Neville Rochow, “Protecting 
Religious Freedom under Bills of Rights: Australia as Microcosm” in their edited volume, Freedom of 
Religion under Bills of Rights (Adelaide: University of Adelaide Press, 2012) ch 1 and Joel Harrison 
and Patrick Parkinson, “Freedom Beyond the Commons: Managing the Tension between Faith and 
Equality in a Multicultural Society” ((2014) 40 Monash U L Rev 413. 
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(or deepest beliefs) and practices are being infringed? If the word “religion” itself is 
increasingly odious, can we sidestep its negative connotations? 
 The most promising candidate for a reframing of the issue is to assess claims for 
religious liberty as claims for liberty of conscience. There at least three advantages conscience 
appears to have over religion. 
 
1  Universal and inclusive 
Within the context of contemporary societies marked by moral and religious 
diversity, it is not religious convictions in themselves that must enjoy a special 
status, but, rather, all core beliefs that allow individuals to structure their moral 
identity.4 
Everyone has a conscience5; but not everyone has a religion. Nobody can be against conscience 
any more than being against ice-cream, clean air and the preservation of pandas; but plenty of 
people are hostile to religion—especially institutional or organized religion and conservative, 
traditional or countercultural faith communities. 
Conscience appeals as a broader and, indeed, more universal basis than religion upon which 
to protect the deepest concerns citizens possess in liberal democratic societies6—places where 
a sizeable (and increasing) percentage of the population in the 21st century profess no religious 
affiliation.7 Citizens who are atheists, agnostics, rationalists, free thinkers, sceptics or just plain 
“spiritual” (in an unattached, non-affiliated way that defies simple categorization by social 
scientists or census compilers) can avail themselves of this right. Citizens who are religious 
																																																						
4 Jocelyn Maclure and Charles Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience (Cambridge, MA, 
Harvard University Press, 2011) at 89. 
5 See eg Martha Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience (New York: Basic Books, 2008) at 19 and 52. 
6 “Conscience proves a useful concept for religious freedom because, unlike religion, it seems to be a 
universal concept—most would agree that they have one and would prefer for it to remain 
unmolested. The conscience therefore provides a convenient, publically accessible stand-in for 
religion, which is why so many contemporary theorists favor it. It diminishes the specialness of 
religion, or at least it doesn’t discriminate against the nonreligious by giving the believer something 
that is not given to the unbeliever.” Jonathan Leeman, Political Church (IVP Academic) at 74-75. 
7 The most recent NZ Census reported that 41.9 % of New Zealanders answered “no religion” to the 
religious affiliation question: Statistics NZ, Census 2013 (The figure was 34.6% in 2006): 
http://www.stats.govt.nz/Census/2013-census/profile-and-summary-reports/quickstats-culture-
identity/religion.aspx. In Australia, the latest census (2016) showed 30.1% responded “no religion” 




can appeal to the non-religious on the very same basis, viz, that their conscience (albeit 
religiously informed) requires recognition.8 
Conscience, defined broadly, seems to be the universal category, and religion, or religious 
conscience, is a subset of it.9  The Supreme Court of Canada put it this way: 
The purpose of s 2(a) [of the Charter, protecting religion and conscience] is to 
ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that 
govern one’s perception of oneself, humanity, nature, and in some cases, a 
higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one’s conduct 
and practices.10 
Profoundly personal beliefs governing one’s life are what is at stake and these may “in some 
cases” include beliefs in a deity or the afterlife—but not necessarily. 
 
2   Existing legal recognition 
 
Appealing to the right of conscience is not promoting something new. The seminal 
international human rights instruments were all worded in terms of the right of religion and 
conscience. Thus, for example, Article 18 of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1948 begins: “Everyone has the right of freedom of thought, conscience and religion…”.11 The 
domestic formulations of the right of religious freedom similarly place “conscience” alongside 
“religion” as equally deserving of recognition and protection.12 Appeals to the protection of 
conscience simply emphasize something that was always there, but was kept in the shade by 
its more prominent cousin (religion). 
 
3   Definitional problems are avoided 
 
																																																						
8 Leeman, Political Church, at 75. 
9 Maclure and Taylor, Secularism and Freedom of Conscience, at 90. 
10 R v Edwards Book and Art Ltd [1986] 2 SCR 713 at 759 [97] per Dickson CJ (emphasis added). 
11 See likewise Art 18 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966; Art 9 (1) 
of the European Convention on Human Rights 1950; and Art 1(1) of the UN Declaration on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 1981. See 
generally Paul M Taylor, Freedom of Religion: UN and European Rights and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
12 See, eg, Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), s 14. Section 46 of the 
Constitution Act 1934 (Tas) provides: “Freedom of conscience and the free profession and practise of 
religion are, subject to public order and morality, guaranteed to every citizen.”  See also, eg, ss 13 and 
15 of the NZ Bill of Rights Act 1990; s 2(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982. 
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The legal protection of religious freedom necessarily requires courts and tribunals to eventually 
determine what counts as “religion” or “religious” belief.13 Now the US courts, faced with a 
bewildering variety of claims under the First Amendment, have battled long and hard with this 
and come up with some reasonably workable definitions.14 The European Court of Human 
Rights has had its own tentative exploration of this concept too.15 The High Court of Australia 
in Church of the New Faith16 has, in my opinion, one of the best judicial tests.  
 Whichever test is propounded there will be some eccentric person—or a fledgling group 
of such citizens—that will find it hard to fit their novel or idiosyncratic claim within the 
boundaries of “religion” as defined. All definitions exclude. Thus, some citizens may miss out 
on their deepest and cherished beliefs about the meaning of life being safeguarded. 
“Conscience”, by contrast, seems a very big tent indeed. Everyone has one and we do not 
appear to have much difficulty in agreeing upon exactly what it is. Granted, there are, if one 
probes more deeply, different understandings of what the notion is, but the latitude for 
disagreement over its core meaning is narrow—certainly much narrower than over the 
definition of “religion”. 
Once the definitional hurdle is out of the way, the only question of significance becomes 
the genuineness or sincerity of the person’s (or group’s) beliefs. Is their claim of conscience 
genuine? We need not be concerned with the content of the beliefs, but only with their sincerity. 
Here the law is on much firmer ground. It has some very well-developed tests to assess the 
sincerity of a claim and to screen out opportunist, bogus or sham protestations.17 
 
III   Weaknesses with Freedom of Conscience—Or Why it may Fail to 
Deliver 
 
Freedom of conscience initially appears superior to freedom of religion as a basis for claims. 
Yet I believe it has some major drawbacks. But first, a brief look at the term “conscience” itself 
seems called for.  In earlier times its meaning would emphasize its divine source: “the sanctuary 
																																																						
13 See generally Rex Ahdar and Ian Leigh, Religious Freedom in the Liberal State (2nd edn, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2013) at 139-156. 
14 See eg Kent Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution Volume 1: Free Exercise and Fairness 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006) at ch 8. 
15 See eg Russell Sandberg, Law and Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) at ch 
3. 
16  Church of the New Faith v Commissioner for Payroll Tax (Vic) (1983) 154 CLR 120 at 136 
(Mason ACJ and Brennan J) and 174 (Wilson and Deane JJ). 
17 See Ahdar and Leigh, Religious Freedom, at 195-96; Greenawalt, Religion and the Constitution, at 
ch 7; Anna Su, “Judging Religious Sincerity” (2016) 5 Oxford J L & Religion 28. 
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of man, where he is alone with God whose voice echoes within him.”18 There are various 
definitions of conscience in modern usage,19 but the Kantian notion of an inner judge or witness 
is perhaps the most prevalent: 
the core idea is, roughly, . . a capacity to sense or immediately discern that what 
he or she has done, is doing, or is about to do (or not do) is wrong, bad, and 
worthy of disapproval.20  
the faculty of subjective moral judgment21 
that person’s judgment of the moral quality of his or her conduct22 
 
1   Erroneous Location within the Forum Internum 
 
If we take “conscience” to be an inner voice, witness or judge, then its obvious location would 
seem to be within what international human rights law calls the forum internum.23 This 
describes “the internal and private realm of the individual against which no State interference 
is justified in any circumstances.”24 
This is a problem because protection of the forum internum by the international legal 
organs has been rather haphazard and limited, if not to say non-existent.25 What one thinks or 
believes in one’s innermost mind is typically assumed to be inaccessible and invulnerable; the 
inner sanctum is commonly seen to be impervious to outside interference, and hence requires 
no protection. The authoritative General Comment No 22 of the UN Human Rights Committee 
observes: 
The right to thought, conscience and religion . . . in article 18(1) is far-reaching 
and profound . . . .  The fundamental character of these freedoms is. . .  reflected 
in the fact that this provision cannot be derogated from, even in time of public 
emergency. . . . 
																																																						
18 John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (Encyclical, 6 August 1993) at para 55 (in turn quoting the Second 
Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes (7 December 1965) at para 16). 
19 See eg Nussbaum, Liberty of Conscience at 19, who describes it as “the faculty in human beings 
with which they search for life’s meaning”.  
20 Thomas E Hill Jr, “Four Conceptions of Conscience” in Ian Shapiro and Robert Adams (eds), 
Nomos XL: Integrity and Conscience (New York: New York University Press, 1998) ch 2, at 14. 
21 Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, “Jiminy Cricket: A Commentary on Professor Hill’s Four Conceptions of 
Conscience” in Nomos XL, ibid, ch 3, at 53. 
22 Nadia N Sawicki, “The Hollow Promise of Conscience” (2012) 33 Cardozo L Rev 1389 at 1395. 
23 For a comprehensive analysis see Taylor, Freedom of Religion, ch 3. See also Peter Petkoff, 
“Forum Internum and Forum Externum in Canon Law and Public International Law with a Particular 
Reference to the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights” (2012) 7 Religion & Human 
Rights 183. 
24 Taylor, Freedom of Religion, at 115. 
25 Ibid. 
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Article 18 distinguishes the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief 
from the freedom to manifest religion or belief. It does not permit any 
limitations whatsoever on the freedom of thought and conscience or on the 
freedom to have or adopt a religion or belief of one’s choice. These freedoms 
are protected unconditionally. . . 26 
 
In domestic courts, the well-established belief/action dichotomy operates a similar way. 
The American Supreme Court way back in Reynolds observed: “Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and 
opinions, they may with practices.”27 And later the Court affirmed that the First Amendment 
“embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in 
the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct must be subject to regulation for the 
protection of society.”28 
Thus, the inner forum is not subject to the standard limits upon state interference that 
govern the law guaranteeing the right to act upon or “manifest” one’s religion or belief. If there 
is no way it can be interfered with by the state, then, logically, any explicit limits upon 
attempted state interference in this inner realm are superfluous. You do not need to tell the state 
to back off if the state cannot penetrate this sanctuary anyway. 
But there are two problems. First, if forms of insidious and incessant state psychological 
coercion, propaganda or “indoctrination” cannot dent one’s inner realm—remember, nothing 
can—then these, it seems, receive a pass. Paradoxically then, conscience is absolutely protected 
whilst simultaneously not being protected at all. Second, the factual presupposition is unsound. 
The idea that “while your entire world in the public sphere might be completely demolished, 
[nonetheless] your private sphere somehow remains intact”29 is naïve and fanciful in the 
extreme. It rests, as Peter Petkoff notes, upon a misunderstanding of the reality of the inevitable 
transference or overlap between belief and action, the private and public realms.30 
 By contrast, the forum externum—the realm of conduct or actions that sees individuals 
(and groups) express or “manifest” their inner beliefs—always needs protection by the law. 
Actions unlike “mere religious beliefs and opinions” can be restricted by the state. But unlike 
innermost thoughts—which receive unqualified and absolute protection in a hermetically 
																																																						
26  Italics added. The Comment is reproduced in Taylor, ibid, at 378-79. 
27 Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145 at 166 (1879)(italics mine). In Canada see eg B(R) v 
Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto [1995] 1 SCR 315 (Sup Ct). See further Ahdar and 
Leigh, Freedom of Religion, at 163-165. 
28 Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 US 296 at 303-304 (1940)(italics mine). 
29 Petkoff “Forum Internum”, at 188. 
30 Petkoff, “Forum Internum”, passim. 
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sealed inner space—the right to act upon those beliefs can never be absolute, for actions can 
impinge upon others. So the usual limitations permitting state interference with fundamental 
human rights apply: religious conduct cannot threaten “public safety, health, morals or the 
fundamental rights or freedoms of others.”31  
If we could get conscience placed in the forum externum it would appear to be better 
safeguarded. It would at least get qualified protection. Can we do that? My answer is yes. 
 
A brief digression 
 
It is only if we go back to the early Christian understandings of conscience that see that, strictly 
speaking, the inner judge or voice is not conscience but rather something called synderesis. 
Christian theologians beginning with Jerome, but most fully developed by St Thomas Aquinas, 
drew a distinction between synderesis and conscientia.32 The inner faculty or “spark” that 
illuminates every human being, and always habitually inclines them towards good and away 
from evil, is synderesis. By contrast, conscientia comes after synderesis and is the application 
of that understanding or light to particular concrete circumstances. Robert Vischer puts it well: 
“Although a person’s faculty of apprehension was called ‘synderesis,’ only the faculty of 
application—action derived from apprehension—received the label ‘conscientia.’”33 
Whilst synderesis is infallible and cannot be extinguished, people can, through their 
free will, and the exercise of judgment, act in a way contrary to the dictates of syndersis. The 
conscientia is free and can err; but synderesis is not free, and it always points to the good, is 
intrinsically upright and so cannot err.34 The Catechism of the Catholic Church refers to this 
duality as follows: 
Conscience includes the perception of the principles of morality (synderesis): 
their application in the given circumstances by practical discernment of reasons 
and goods; and finally, judgment about concrete acts yet to be performed or 
already performed.35  
 
																																																						
31 Article 18(3) of the ICCPR. 
32 See Luc-Thomas Somme, “The infallibility, impeccability and indestructibility of synderesis” 
(2006) 19 Studies in Christian Ethics 403. 
33 Conscience and the Common Good: Reclaiming the Space Between Person and State (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010) at 3 (original italics). 
34 Somme, “Indestructibility of synderesis”, at 410. 
35 Catechism of the Catholic Church at para 1780. 
	 9	
This might all seem like an arcane digression into Scholastic theology, but it is relevant 
to my argument. Synderesis does belong in the forum internum, the repository of pure belief 
and thought. But conscientia (conscience)—the act of judgment prompted by the light of 
synderesis—does not. It belongs in the forum externum. So, if we understood conscience 
correctly then it might receive a darn sight more protection. 
 
2   The Rise of the Unanchored Conscience 
 
In modern usage, the notion of conscience is a truncated or distorted one. It retains the idea of 
an inner voice. But the inner voice is not an infallible, unerring one, and the speaker is not 
articulating “the principles of morality” (as the Catholic Catechism terms it), the universal 
basic moral law,36 the natural law37—or, more simply—the speaker is not God. Rather, the 
inner judge is really the autonomous self’s best grasp of the good and right, an individual’s 
“culturally influenced, personally generated, subjectively held moral opinions.”38  If there is an 
external voice, it is Walt Disney’s Jiminy Cricket—but then he just passes the buck back to 
Pinocchio and tells him (after giving a little whistle) to “always let your conscience be your 
guide.”39 
Conscience in modern times has become detached or unanchored from synderesis. You 
might say it is unhinged. I am making fun of this. but it is no laughing matter. Just as the word 
has fallen into desuetude, the importance of what it signifies has also. 
 The point was made presciently by Cardinal John Henry Newman in the 19th century. 
In his Letter to the Duke of Norfolk in 1875 he wrote: “When men advocate the rights of 
conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of the creator, nor the duty to Him, in thought and 
deed, of the creature; but the right of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their 
judgement or their humour, without any thought of God at all.”40  And in a later (1897) Letter 
to the good Duke he was blunter: 
																																																						
36 J Budziszewski, “Handling Issues of Conscience” (1999) 3 The Newman Rambler 2 at 3. 
37 Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor, at para 59. 
38 Stolzenberg, “Jiminy Cricket”, at 66. 
39 “Give a little whistle” (music and lyrics by Leigh Harline and Ned Washington) from the film, 
Pinocchio (1940): https://www.disneyclips.com/lyrics/lyrics79.html and 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51x532yW1lY 
40 Newman, A Letter Addressed to His Grace the Duke of Norfolk on Occasion of Mr. Gladstone 
Recent Expostulation (London: B M Pickering, 1875), 58: quoted in Charlotte Hansen, “Newman 
Conscience and Authority”, 209 at 211.  
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Conscience has rights because it has duties; but in this age, with a large portion 
of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with 
conscience. Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century, it has been 
superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard 
of and could not have mistaken for it they had. It is the right of self-will.41 
Professor Robert George’s recent work carries on this tradition.  
Conscience, as Newman understood it, is the very opposite of “autonomy” in 
the modern liberal sense. It is not the writer of permission slips. It is not in the 
business of licensing us to do as we please…. [By contrast, today] conscience 
as “self-will” is a matter of feeling or emotion, not reason. It is concerned not 
so much with identifying what one has a duty to do or not do, one’s feelings and 
desires to the contrary notwithstanding, but rather with sorting out one’s 
feelings. Conscience as self-will identifies permissions, not obligations. It 
licenses behavior by establishing that one doesn’t feel bad about doing it…42 
 
Conscience is no longer the “stern monitor” (as Newman called it) imposing duties that 
originate from outside the individual. Instead, it has become “the writer of permission slips” 
based upon one’s earnest feelings. The secularization of the concept of conscience43 is thus 
complete, and so we should not be surprised that “one critical element is completely missing: 
namely the idea that conscience is an echo of the voice of God in man or a manifestation of 
divine law.” Of course, this secularization is perfect for a secular liberal polity that puts a 
premium on personal autonomy.  
 
3   The Implications of the Unanchored Conscience 
 
Does it matter that conscience today is not connected to, or constrained, by the objective moral 
order, however that is defined? Does it matter the individual conscience is “radically 
																																																						
41 Quoted in Robert P George, “Two Concepts of Liberty…. And Conscience” in his Conscience and 
Its Enemies (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2013) ch 10 at 111. 
42 George, ibid, at 112. 
43 See Rafael Domingo, “Restoring freedom of conscience” (2015) 30 J of L & Religion 176 at 183. 
For an excellent historic account see Martin Fitzpatrick, “Enlightenment and Conscience” in John 
McLaren and Harold Coward (eds), Religious Conscience, the State and the Law (Albany: State 
University of New York, 1999) at ch 4. Interestingly, Fitzpatrick (at 56) clarified: “Ideas of 
conscience undoubtedly were naturalized, universalized, made democratic and, to a degree, 
secularized” (italics added). He continued (ibid at 56-57): “Enlightenment thinkers retained a sense of 
the intimate relationship between the religious and moral dimensions of conscience and were well 
aware that the obligations to follow conscience ultimately arose from a religious duty”. 
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subjectivist”44, “the faculty of subjective moral judgment”45 and its decisions cannot be 
gainsaid as “erroneous”—as long as they be sincere and authentic?46  I believe so.  
 
1   Unpredictable claims and unpalatable outcomes 
 
First, it can give rise to an expanding number of claims over some highly-contentious  
activities, not to mention, at times, some perverse or outlandish outcomes.47 The most flagrant 
historical example is perhaps those Nazis, such as Adolf Eichmann, who had no problems with 
conscience despite supervising the sending of millions to the gas chambers.48 Perhaps it is more 
accurate to say that, as Hannah Arendt so persuasively argued, Eichmann’s conscience was 
warped by his peers and Third Reich society: 
His conscience was indeed set at rest when he saw the zeal and eagerness with 
which “the good society” everywhere reacted as he did. He did not “close his 
ears to the voice of conscience,” as the judgment has it, not because he had none, 
but because his conscience spoke with a ‘respectable voice,” with the voice of 
respectable society around him.49 
Notoriously, the US Supreme Court grounded the right to abortion in, effectively, a citizen’s 
right of conscience.50 Could one’s subjective moral judgment—sincere and genuine, to be 
sure—lead some to one day confidently assert a conscience claim to euthanize their suffering 
next-of-kin, to marry their brother or sister, and so on? 
 
 2   A downgrading of conscience  
 
																																																						
44 Veritatis Splendor at para 32. 
45 Stolzenberg, “Jiminy Cricket”, at 53. 
46 “In a liberal pluralistic society, the objective truth or falsity of an individual's moral commitments 
cannot form the justification for determining when to accommodate conscience”: Elizabeth Sepper, 
“Taking Conscience Seriously” (2012) 98 Virg L Rev 1501 at 1529. 
47 Leeman, Political Church, at 89. 
48 Paul Strohm, Conscience: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 
87-88; Peter Fuss, “Conscience” (1964) 74 Ethics 111 at 119. The classic work is Hannah Arendt, 
Eichmann in Jerusalem (London: Faber & Faber, 1963).  
49 Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem, at 111-112. See also ibid at 131: “For the sad and very 
uncomfortable truth of the matter was that it was not his fanaticism but his very conscience that 
prompted Eichmann to adopt his uncompromising attitude [‘to make the Final Solution final’(130)] 
during the last year of the war…” 
50  In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v Casey, 505 US 833, 850-51 (1991), the 
Court noted that “men and women of good conscience can disagree” about abortion and that matters 
such as the right to abortion are found in “the right to define one’s concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 
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Secondly, the status of conscience as something the state ought to respect is diminished, even 
downgraded, once we see it stripped down to no more than an expression of a person’s self-
will or autonomy, to his or her “personal inscrutable moral code”51. Marie Failinger speaks of 
“the transmutation of religious conscience into a type of human choice.”52 Our solicitude for 
those caught in the throes of obedience to the divine voice is one thing. Our respect for 
conscience because it is what a person really believes to be right—“which in turn seems pretty 
much equivalent to saying that ‘a person should do what he believes he should do’”53—is 
another matter. 54 Thus, as Steven Smith explains: 
attaching freedom of conscience to autonomy may have the effect of both 
transforming and trivializing the commitment. In its formative period, after all, 
the commitment to freedom of conscience rested precisely on a belief that 
people are not autonomous, but rather are dependent on—and obligated by—a 
higher and personal Power. That belief was what justified special respect for 
people who were acting not just from the normal mundane motives, and 
certainly not as autonomous agents, but from conscience. Dissolving conscience 
into autonomy turns conscience on its head and deprives it of this justification 
for special respect.55 
The lower status of conscience compared to religion may, as Paul Horwitz astutely 
argues, rebound against claimants when tribunals conduct the usual balancing exercise 
whereby countervailing interests are weighed against the claimant’s cause: 
Despite how seriously our constitutional culture treats claims of conscience, it 
is much easier to disregard a claim that rests on individual conscience than one 
that rests of absolute truth, or to conclude that such a claim, if it rests on 
conscience alone, can be outweighed by more immediate and worldly 
considerations.56 
																																																						
51 Vischer, Conscience and the Common Good, at 18. 
52 Marie Failinger, “Wondering after Babel: Power, Freedom and Ideology in US Supreme Court 
Interpretations of the Religion Clauses” in Rex Ahdar (ed), Law and Religion (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2000) ch 5 at 95. 
53 Smith, “The Phases and Functions of Freedom of Conscience” (2010) at 1 and 16. 
54 See also Failinger, “Wondering after Babel” at 93, noting that freedom of conscience “began as an 
argument that the government must ensure a free response by the individual called distinctively by the 
Divine within”, but now “the word ‘conscience’…has come to mean very little beyond the notion of 
personal existential decision-making”. 
55 Smith, “The Phases and Functions”, at 17. See also Roger Trigg, Equality, Freedom, and Religion 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) at 103-106. 
56 The Agnostic Age: Law, Religion and the Constitution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 
184. See also at 301. Roger Trigg, Equality, Freedom and Religion, at 106 makes the same point: 
“Assimilating religion to wider issues of conscience is very common. Sometimes it is made with a 
view to ensuring that the religious conscience cannot claim any special privileges…. The danger is 
that devaluing a religious conscience results in all claims of conscience being ignored. Other forms of 
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Why would this be so? The conversion, explains Horwitz, of all plausible claims 
(religious or non-religious) into matters of conscience “allows courts to treat them as mere 
matters of conscience, as it were.”57  With a well-argued religious claim the court is made fully 
aware of “how profound and difficult”58 a quandary the religious believer is in. (I would go 
further and suggest there is perhaps, subconsciously, an historical and cultural echo of the tragic 
choices that renowned believers of times past (St Thomas More, Martin Luther et al) faced—
and which are being re-enacted, in a more modest way to be sure, here today.) The decision-
makers can at least imagine the possible truth of religious beliefs and practices,59viz, the 
believer maybe did hear from a deity, to whom her or she might one day account to.  
By contrast, a claim of conscience—at least as conscience is currently understood—
seems far less compelling. Recall that the unanchored conscience has undergone a 
transmogrification into a matter of personal autonomy, an expression of self-will. In the 
modern era, the claim of conscience is no longer concerned with the truth or content of the 
claim, but simply whether it is sincere. As Horwitz puts it “claims are viewed as important 
primarily because the person believes them to be true, not because they are (or may be) true.”60 
Or, to be even blunter, the claim “is viewed as having less to do with the truth than with a 
feeling in someone’s head.”61 
 
3  Ill-suited to collective or institutional beliefs and practices 
 
The modern understanding of conscience centres upon its critical role in personal and 
individual decision-making. That seems to make the claims of freedom of conscience by 
religious communities and institutions tenuous, if not ruled out entirely.62 It seems a stretch to 
say a religious corporation qua corporation has a conscience.  
 Admittedly we sometimes do see exemptions for religious institutions in recognition 
that they might hold a distinct “moral identity” or “mission”. In the Hobby Lobby case in the 
United States, there was an exemption written into the Obamacare law to exempt “religious 
																																																						
conscience may claim parity with a religious one and want equal respect. The reality is that all then 
may be equally ignored, if they obstruct favoured social priorities.” (italics added) 
57 Agnostic Age at 184 (italics in original). 
58 Ibid at 279. 
59 Ibid at 278-279. 
60 Ibid at 184 (italics in original). 
61 Ibid at 278. 
62 See Sepper, “Taking Conscience Seriously”, at 1539 et seq. 
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employers” from segments of the compulsory coverage of employees, specifically coverage 
that included contraceptives having an abortion-like operation.63 (The issue in the case was 
whether for-profit “close” companies owned by religious persons could assert a religious 
freedom claim.64)  But “moral identity” is not the same as conscience. More on that soon. 
Conscience, whilst it looks capacious, may actually be under-inclusive.65 Some claims 
that are presently recognized as religious liberty ones may not fit under the conscience 
umbrella. Andrew Koppelman rightly points out that “‘conscience’ is a poor characterization 
of the desire of a church to expand its building to be able to hold its growing congregation as 
in City of Boerne v Flores.”66 That case involved the battle by the Catholic Diocese of San 
Antonio to enlarge the St Peter the Apostle Cathedral in Boerne, a town about 30 miles from 
San Antonio. This move to expand the size of the Cathedral was opposed by the city authorities 
who—concerned with architectural and aesthetic matters in an area zoned as a heritage 
precinct—invoked historic places legislation to thwart it.67 The Church and the city authorities 
eventually struck a compromise and the Cathedral’s expansion took place, but only after years 
of delay and considerable legal costs.  
The New Zealand analogue is the ongoing attempt by the Anglican Diocese of 
Christchurch to have a modern-style, less expensive, cathedral to meet its liturgical and pastoral 
needs. The vehement opposition by secular groups who insist that the neo-Gothic mason and 
stone building be fully restored—following the calamitous 2011 earthquake—means the issue 
is still being fought over. I was unable to convince The Christchurch Press that there was a 
religious freedom issue here at all.68 The editors would have given even shorter shrift to the 
Diocese’ cause if I had said, in my op-ed piece, the Anglican Church’s “conscience” was being 
violated. 
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Robert Vischer’s book, Conscience and the Common Good69 is a valuable attempt to 
show that we labour under too atomized a notion of conscience: 
There is a clear need to recapture the relational dimension of conscience—the 
notion that the dictates of conscience are defined, articulated and lived out in 
relationship with others…. As such conscience cannot be explained as a free 
standing individual construct. It might be expressed and defined by the 
individual, but its substance and real-world implications are relational by their 
very nature. Cultivating and maintaining the conditions necessary for these 
relationships to thrive should be a priority for our society if we are serious about 
freedom of conscience.70 
If individuals’ consciences are nurtured and empowered by relationships, then, argues 
Vischer, the groups and associations that foster these relationships deserve cultivating too. But 
can we say a group has its own freestanding conscience independent from its members? Here 
even Vischer (despite penning an entire book devoted to expanding our understanding of the 
role of conscience) shrinks back: “It is more sensible to say that groups can serve as vehicles 
for conscience and that, although the relational nature of conscience makes such groups 
essential to conscience’s flourishing, a group’s distinct moral identity is built on the moral 
content of its members’ consciences.”71 And later, “ the corporation is a moral agent with the 
capacity for exercising a robust institutional conscience—not in the sense that the corporation 
serves as a conscience-wielding being, but in the sense that the corporation serves as a venue 
and a vehicle for the sharing of conscience-driven claims among its constituents.”72 So a 
group’s conscience, if we want to use that expression, is simply the aggregation of all its 
member’s individual consciences. Groups and corporations may possess a moral identity (a 
reputation or “brand”, to put it crassly), but not a conscience. 
Aside from being ill-suited to catch group claims, Koppelman is surely right that a lot 
of commonplace religious practice is engaged in “out of habit, adherence to custom, a need to 
cope with misfortune, injustice, temptation and guilt, curiosity about religious truth”73 and so 
on.  It has little to do with cool cerebral reflection or obedience to an inner voice. It is 
interesting, continues Koppelman, that in the celebrated American case of Employment 
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Division v Smith (the peyote case) neither of the religious freedom claimants—who sought to 
use peyote, a controlled drug, as a sacrament in their Native American Church—was motivated, 
it seems, by his conscience. One was motivated primarily by his interest in exploring his Native 
American ethnic identity, and the other was merely curious about the Church.74 
 
4  Difficult clashes of conscience 
 
If one citizen’s conscientious judgment is as valid as another’s, then there is no obvious 
unimpeachable way to adjudicate between them.75 In another age, and in homogenous societies, 
we might expect the vast majority of citizens to have a similar understanding of synderesis. 
The opportunities for disputes based on different applications of moral judgment (conscientia) 
would be still present—for the application of one’s grasp of the moral law to concrete 
circumstances can err. The inner voice can be ignored because of “the habitual inclination 
towards vice and the impetuousness of passion.”76  But clashes would be relatively few given 
a similar shared apprehension of the moral law (synderesis).  
Now, however, many have abandoned a commitment to any kind of transcendent 
objective order, eschewed reliance upon an external moral law—synderesis has been forgotten, 
rejected or discarded. Others may hold to a synderesis, but not the synderesis.77 Liberal 
democracies are marked by moral and religious pluralism and citizens adhere to different 
worldviews. If conscience is the touchstone and our consciences are rooted in, or have 
developed from, completely different starting points, we should not be surprised that conflicts 
will be frequent. 
 My conscience tells me I cannot participate in same-sex weddings; your conscience 
tells you that you must follow your heart and marry your object d’amour or, as an employer, 
you must not allow your employees to discriminate against same-sex couples. Whose 
conscience is more likely to win the day?78 Sometimes the conflict will be between the 
government and the individual—as in the classic instance of a military draft law imposed upon 
																																																						
74 Ibid. 
75 The gravamen of Arthur Allen Leff’s classic article, “Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law” [1979] 
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a pacifist. Increasingly, however, the clash will be between non-state actors, each driven by 
conscience.79 Will the eventual victor in such disputes be the claimant whose conscience is 
more attuned to the prevailing ideologies of the day? Will it dependent upon the prevailing 
orthodoxy or worldview of those in positions of power and influence?  
Reliance upon conscience as a stand-in for religion is fine (from the believers’ 
standpoint) where—in a former age—virtually everyone understood conscience (or at least 
synderesis) the same way. But, as Jonathan Leeman, insightfully notes 
In a nation of believers and unbelievers, the unattached, unaccountable 
conscience will be employed to legitimize the freedom of various religions 
(institutionally defined) only as long as the conscience of a nation’s decision-
makers value them. When a nation’s decision makers decide that the traditional 
(substantivist) institutional religions are a threat to liberty or equality or 
tolerance, they will banish them, first from the public square, then from the 
market place, and perhaps, in partial ways, from the home (“No, you may not 
indoctrinate your children”).80 
I have written elsewhere about a Wellington (or Canberra, Westminster or 
Washington/New York Times etc) Worldview.81 By this I mean the mindset of the vast majority 
of parliamentarians, bureaucrats, consultants, academics, educators, business leaders, company 
directors, news media editors, pundits and journalists, medical specialists and doctors, judges 
and lawyers, and so on. Secular liberal thought and values operate by way of subconscious 
absorption or osmosis. There subsists amongst the knowledge sector—or, less politely, “the 
chattering classes”—a “latent moral ideology,”82 The prevailing worldview held by the powers-
that-be is, I maintain, increasingly incompatible with and unsympathetic to religious beliefs 
and conduct, especially conservative expressions of faith. 
 
IV   An Illustration: ‘Complicity-based’ Conscience Claims 
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Conscience claims are not new. For instance, we have long grown use to medical professionals’ 
conscientious objection to participation in abortion: the state, through suitably crafted 
legislative exemptions, will usually make due allowance for this.83 
But more generally—and the military and medical fields aside—there have been a 
growing number of assertions of conscience by suppliers of everyday goods or services who, 
in good conscience, feel compelled not to supply these things. In the litigious US, we have a 
dreary litany of examples: the Christian flower shop owners or photographers who do not want 
to provide their wares to a same-sex couple’s wedding day celebration spring to mind.84 In 
Australia we have the recent Cobaw case,85 but perhaps the best-known non-American example 
is the Ashers Baking86 saga. 
The plaintiff, Gareth Lee, a homosexual activist, ordered a cake from a Belfast bakery.87 
The icing on Mr Lee’s cake would have the words “Support Gay Marriage”, the logo of 
QueerSpace (a LGBT lobby organization) and a colour picture of the Sesame Street TV show 
characters, Ernie and Bert. After initially (and reluctantly) accepting the order on the day, Mrs 
Karen McArthur, a director of the family firm, phoned back Lee telling him the bakery could 
no longer fulfill his order. To do so would violate the owner’s, the Macarthur family’s, religious 
beliefs. McArthur apologized and arranged for a refund. Lee was upset and the culmination of 
his grievance was a successful complaint to the Equality Commission. The County Court held 
that the defendant bakery had contravened the Equality Act (Sexual Orientation) Regulations 
(Northern Ireland) 2006 and the Fair Employment and Treatment Order 1998. Ashers Baking’s 
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conduct in refusing the cake order constituted unlawful direct discrimination on the basis of 
the customer’s sexual orientation. The defendants’ pleas that their religious beliefs provided 
them with a defence were rejected. They contended that to accept the order would have forced 
them to violate their conscience by endorsing a cultural phenomenon (same-sex marriage) that 
they did not, based on their sincere religious convictions, agree with.88 It was to no avail. The 
Court of Appeal in Belfast agreed and the case is set down to be heard in the Supreme Court.89 
Some American scholars are worried at what they discern to be this entire new breed of 
exemption claims, which they call “complicity-based conscience claims”—requests to be 
exempt from having to be complicit in others’ immoral activities, or from having to facilitate 
them. Professors Nejaime and Siegel explain: 
Complicity claims are faith claims about how to live in community with others 
who do not share the claimant’s beliefs and whose lawful conduct the person of 
faith believes to be sinful. Because these claims are explicitly oriented toward 
third parties, they present special concerns about third party harms.90 
 
It is hard to find much in the way of direct adverse material or economic consequences 
to the other (third) party arising from the granting of legal exemptions: few would-be 
consumers would be denied the goods or services, or be forced to incur considerable time and 
cost to secure them elsewhere. Certainly, Mr Lee had many other bakeries in Belfast to ice his 
cake. Absent some sort of local monopoly, or the objecting provider being a remote rural area, 
there are nearly always other providers available to service the needs of the consumers 
rebuffed.  
Accordingly, critics turned their attention to the emergence of “dignitary harms”: an 
accommodation granted by the state to the claimants, they contend, sends an adverse social 
signal, one with the power to stigmatize91 those who engage in the conduct in question 
(abortion, same-sex marriage, etc). Furthermore, accommodation of the complicity-based kind 
further fuels the fires of the culture wars and “provide[s] an avenue to extend, rather than settle, 
conflict about social norms in democratic contest.”92 One can almost hear the sigh: we 
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(progressive, enlightened, liberal citizens) have finally triumphed when it comes to LGBT 
rights, reproductive rights, and so on. But the conflict is stubbornly kept alive when the state 
is willing to grant exemptions to recalcitrant citizens who refuse to move with the times. Thus, 
for example, Nejaime and Siegel lament: “The network of conscience exemptions that the anti-
abortion movement seeks to enact functions like other laws pressed by the movement: it 
impedes access to abortion.”93 Well, that might not be the prime aim of the claimants pressing 
their conscientious objection—they simply want to be excused—but they would be more than 
pleased with this broad societal “side-effect”. 
Here is my point. The dignitary harm notion is, I believe, an overly broad and fuzzy 
conception of what constitutes harm to others. When we move away from direct, tangible 
harms to diffuse, indirect, psychological ones, the potential to severely shrink the scope for 
protection of conscience is clear.94 It confuses what is at the heart of the accommodation by the 
state: an exemption from facilitating certain conduct engaged in by third parties—not a 
governmental statement about the third parties’ character, integrity, or moral worth.95 Surely, 
one can decline to participate in an activity that one finds directly contrary to one’s conscience 
without this meaning that you personally view the third parties as “sinners”, or as persons 
possessing less dignity. Can one still hate the sin and not the sinner?96  
Professor Douglas Laycock has, in my view, written a devastating critique of the entire 
complicity claim thesis.97 First, talk of dignitary harms is really another way of saying that 
denied customers will be offended.98 Offence per se is never a sufficient ground to suppress 
conduct or free speech under American constitutional law.99 Outside the US, the recognition of 
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a right not to be offended has some currency but, in my view, this is yet another instance where 
its merits are seriously wanting. 
Next, the talk of dignitary harm is seriously one-sided. It ignores the hurt suffered by 
suppliers whose consciences tell them not to carry through with this proposed action. “Those 
seeking exemption,” Laycock explains patiently, “believe that they are being asked to defy 
God’s will, disrupting the most important relationship in their lives, a relationship with an 
omnipotent being who controls their fates.”100 
Third, framing of the conscience claim as a complicity one does not illuminate, nor 
“do[ ] any analytical work.”101 Opponents of complicity claims are ostensibly concerned with 
the material and dignitary harm to potential consumers. If this is so—I have my doubts—then 
the nature of the practice causing the harm is irrelevant, as is the motivation of the objector, 
viz, whether she says it would make her “complicit in your (the customer’s) sin” or “I would 
be sinning myself.”102 
By calling it a complicity claim I think Nejaime and Siegel mean to subtly downgrade 
the conscience claim. To say that the objector does not wish to participate or be complicit in 
the wrongdoing of another seems to imply that the harm to the claimant is more removed or 
indirect than any immediate and direct personal toll upon his or her conscience. But in no way 
should it obscure the fact that the objector believes her or she—not just the other person—is 
doing something that is deeply wrong.  The McArthurs, the owners of Ashers Bakery, felt they 
would be doing something quite wrong. Laycock deftly alters the facts of Hobby Lobby to 
make this point. Recall that there, the Greens, the owners of the craft stores, objected to 
contracting and paying for employees’ contraceptive coverage that included prepaid 
abortifacients. 
If the Greens provided a prepaid heroin benefit to their employees, or a prepaid 
prostitution benefit, would they be doing wrong just by offering it, tempting 
their employees to use it? Or would they merely be complicit in the wrongdoing 
of those employees who chose to take advantage of the benefit? It is not a line 
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There is a strange and unwarranted type of zero-sum game mentality here:104 if the state 
grants these claimants an exemption, it must somehow detract from the would-be customers’ 
rights and cast aspersions upon their conduct. If such an artificial interpretation of harm were 
to be accepted, it would eradicate a great many conscience-based claims for exemption.  
More worryingly, there is also a vaguely totalitarian air to the dignitary harm theory, 
whose implementation would see the state brook no dissent from newly-established legal 
norms. It seems to say: not only must citizens tolerate their fellow citizen’s conduct, they must 
go along with and facilitate it—and if they refrain from doing so, the state will not hear of it. 
The liberal democratic state begins to take on a totalitarian character to the extent it is “not 
satisfied with passive obedience; it demands full co-operation from the cradle to the grave.”105 
As Nejaime and Siegel soberly caution in the final sentence of their 75-page (!) article: 
[T]he claim for accommodation is not simply an act of withdrawal. Instead, in 
advancing complicity-based claims for exemption, mobilized groups and 
individuals may seek to enforce traditional norms against those who do not 
share their beliefs. Accommodation of these claims may undermine, rather than 
advance, pluralistic values.106 
Nothing, it seems, must stand in the way of what is described tendentiously as “pluralistic 
values.” Here at last we get to what is, I suggest, at the heart of their objection: exemptions for 
conscience—at least for moral or religious conservatives—keep the culture battle alive. 
 
V   Concluding Thoughts 
 
Sole reliance and the complete re-framing of religious freedom claims as freedom of conscience 
claims is unwise. Although the right to liberty of conscience appears to do the same work, it 
simply does not. In certain respects, it is narrower than the right to religious freedom. Placing 
all one’s faith eggs in the conscience basket is risky. 
If I am correct then it seems we are back to the right of religious freedom again—albeit 
supplemented by the right of conscience. We are back to the task of justifying again why we 
should protect religious liberty. I think Michael Stokes Paulsen is right: “[r]espect for religious 
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freedom has faded as appreciation of the fundamental importance of religion to human 
flourishing has waned.”107 
Perhaps we will need to say the right of religious freedom is valuable as an independent 
right, not just because the right protects the very core of an individual’s identity, it fosters 
personal autonomy, it respects human dignity or it offers the resources to oppose tyranny—
although it does all those. No, we may have to grasp the nettle and make the case that religious 
freedom is good because religion is good.108  There, the battle has just begun. 
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